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Tensions between 
different research contexts
Researchers in different contexts are faced with institutional objectives
that are quite different – yet  different constituencies or performers of
research can and do claim that they perform research for societal benefit.
For example, large industrial concerns employ thousands (if not tens or
even hundreds of thousands) of people when the firms’ in-house
research leads to success.  There are other direct benefits from research
in terms of the development of new products, processes, and services.
For pharmaceutical companies, there is no doubt that research leads to
products that save lives and prevent disease.  Of course, this does not
change the fact that private enterprises must turn a profit in order to
make investments in R&D in the first place.
Academic researchers, on the other hand, usually do not have a direct
profit motive in their lines of inquiry, nor do they necessarily care about
the eventual application of their research.  Many academics, especially
those funded directly through their universities, have the freedom and
the motivation to pursue curiosity-driven research no matter what alley
it leads them down.  However — and though this is an old criticism, it
has been around a while because there is some truth to it— it has been
argued, including at the Foresight conference, that many academics
primarily perform research to further their own careers.  This careerist
attitude allegedly started in the US, and has now spread all over the
world, with researchers discussing how many times their publications
got a “hit” in the top journals without ever revealing (because they
think it is unimportant?) what the subject of their research actually was.
One presenter at the Foresight conference pointed out that scientists are
no longer seen as defenders of truth, but more as defenders of their own
interests in “media-driven” (or publicity-driven) science.  
One thing that has changed in recent years, and may have permanently
altered the equation, has been the worldwide explosion in university
intellectual property development.  It involves an enormous growth in
university patenting, and the subsequent prominence of “technology
transfer” offices that attempt to commercialize the intellectual property
of universities (Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1998, document a
compound annual growth rate for university patenting of over 11%
across the 27-year period from 1965-1992).  Thus we have witnessed a
growing profit motive within university administrations, which creates
additional pressures on academic.  Despite the above criticisms, there
can be no doubt that a fair amount of academic research does help
society, both by enabling downstream technological advances, and by
contributing to thinking about bigger, longer-term questions.
Additional profit motives for universities, however, do little to align
universities with industry in terms of accountability; they just reduce
the impartial, long-term nature of academic science (see Bok 2003).
Government is involved in at least two ways.  The first is by funding
third-party research (under science and technology policy, which I will
discuss below), and the second is by funding its own research under its
own auspices.  Governments also indirectly fund research through
paying much of the budgets of their national universities.  In government-
funded national labs and national institutes research ranges from the
basic to the applied, but usually with some national interest in mind,
whether it be defense, health, or even the employment of scientists to
prevent “brain drain.”
The thing to note here is not the differences per se between the objectives
of these various groups, which are pretty well known and documented,
but rather the fact that they are, at times, more or less incompatible
and contradictory. This distinction was pointed out, directly or indirectly,
by several presenters at the Foresight Conference.  Take the case of
Introduction
We are never going to have accountability in research — not in
Europe, and for that matter not anywhere else, either.  At least,
we’ll never see the grand, “unified theory” type of accountability 
to society at large where all constituencies (academic researchers,
government researchers, funding agencies, industrial researchers,
corporate management, university administrators, national and
supranational governments) agree on the goals and means to
achieve those goals to help society.  Perhaps we will not see it even
at more micro levels.  And why not?
• First, too many different constituencies, are concerned and their
views are not only inconsistent — which might be workable — but
also even contradictory, leading to tensions between different
types of research.  Which of them should define standards of
accountability?
• Compounding this situation is the well-documented agency problem
of doing research in general, in which it is difficult to monitor or
provide correct incentives to researchers, leading to tensions between
overseers and researchers.  How can we ensure that scientists
and researchers are actually doing what we want them to do?
• We have multiple stakeholders who fund research, and often several
are simultaneously funding the same recipients, leading to tension
between different sources of funding.  Which, if any, is the
researcher most accountable to?
• Finally, we have the added complexity of the European context, in
which a supranational agent / government / bureaucracy / source
of funding is imposed upon member states, leading to tension
between the EU and its own member states. Those states have their
own research institutions, agendas – and notions of accountability.
Whose “society” should research be accountable to?
These are my conclusions after listening to a day of presentations
on this subject by a distinguished collection of speakers from industry,
academia, and the public sector.  The speakers crystallized thoughts
that I have been pondering some years (see Figure 1).
Europeans can generate 
great fervor for the idea that
research must be “accountable”.
But there are at least three 
powerful, structural reasons
that arriving at a shared notion 
of who is accountable, to whom,
and for what, will be particularly
difficult to achieve here.
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universities publishing potential drug discoveries in the normal
course of doing research.  On one hand, this might appear to carry a
huge benefit for society, something akin to “free software” or “open
science.”  On the other hand, pharmaceutical companies complain
that such publications completely undercut their ability to produce the
drug in question, because “open science” subverts rents from exclusive
intellectual property.  The companies also contend that universities
have no means to bring such drugs to market – meaning, in sum, that
the drug will never be produced by anyone.  Although it seems
hypocritical for pharmaceutical companies to claim that “the patient
is waiting” and “we only want to help society”, while at the same time
declining to produce drugs whose compounds are published in the
scientific literature, they do have a bit of a point.  If they cannot make
any money for their shareholders because anyone can make their
products, in the long run they will not be around to fund the
next big drug discovery.  But once again, the drug in question will
not be produced.
Each in their own ways, both industry and the academy are concerned
with the accountability of research and with helping society.  Yet they
furnish an example of how two agents, each of whom wants to hold
their research “accountable” to society, are actually at odds with each
other and with the best interests of society as a whole.
Tensions between
overseers and researchers
A photo making its way around the Internet shows a frowning executive
wearing a t-shirt emblazoned with the words “We spent $2 billion on
R&D and all we got was this lousy t-shirt.”  One of the reasons that we
often only get a lousy t-shirt for our billions is that it is notoriously
difficult to monitor and control researchers, whether they be based in
government, universities, private companies, or any other organisation.
Without spending too much time on this, let us note that the phenomenon
has been pointed out by numerous scholars ranging from economists to
psychologists to sociologists.  How, then, can we now make researchers
“accountable”?  Because if overseers (called “principals” by economists)
cannot monitor or control what researchers (called “agents,” hence the
term “agency problem”) do when those overseers are not looking over
their shoulder, we might conclude that it would be difficult or even
impossible to make the researchers accountable.
The usual procedures will not be much help here.  Input-based measures
and evaluation procedures are difficult to monitor and can be downright
detrimental to R&D.  One never knows exactly what a scientist or engineer
is doing or working on while conducting R&D.  Inventing strict rules and
controls is bad from both a technology strategy perspective and a human
resources perspective.  For technology strategy, strict controls reduce
serendipity, while for human resources, strict controls de-motivate
researchers.  Certainly, the latter effect depends to some extent on the
constituency – a given research or set of researchers may be more or less
discouraged by regulations – but even industrial researchers may not
accept overly tight rules for conducting independent inquiries in R&D.
On the other hand, output-based measures and evaluation procedures
are extremely “noisy” (in other words, they are very imperfect measures
and procedures that do not directly measure effort).  If managers (or
principals in any sense) base all evaluation on output (new products,
patents, publications, and so forth), incentives shift away from doing
risky work to covering “safe” bets that produce exactly the output
sought.  As an example, many US universities have moved entirely to
“counting” the number of publications for each researchers/scholar,
with a certain target number as the sole criterion for getting a promotion.
The result is a well-documented tendency to produce large numbers of
articles based on trivial research results that are easily published.  The
overall conclusion here is that it is difficult to set up incentive plans that
reward high efforts in R&D. We must instead rely on scientific curiosity,
combined with plans that do not excessively punish the very things
that we are trying to accomplish.
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Tensions between 
funding sources
Not only do we have different constituencies with contradictory
positions regarding the objectives and outcomes of research, but we
often have researchers getting funding from (and therefore, in some
sense, owing accountability to) these different constituencies.  For
example, researchers in large firms often receive R&D funding from
their central R&D labs and government grants at the same time.
Likewise, academic scientists might receive research support from their
universities, funded via endowments, further support from their universities
through indirect funding from government budgets, support from the
government directly via grants, and support from private enterprises.
When more than one of these sources of funding is involved, I propose –
based on my own experience, confirmed by some of the Foresight
presentations – that accountability to the external source is almost always
trumped by accountability to an internal source.  This would indicate
some kind of organizational power argument.  Thus government funding,
when combined with internal funding, ends up only partially serving the
needs of the government, and only inasmuch as there is no conflict
between the funders’ objectives.  Likewise, corporate funding of academic
research only partially serves the research needs of the corporations
(though it may also serve other needs of the corporation, including public
relations and tax considerations), and again only inasmuch as there is
no conflict between the objectives of the researcher, the university, and
the corporation.  But as one can imagine, there are often conflicts.
I am not against science and technology policies; on the contrary,
I believe such policies have helped many countries (including the US
and European countries) both to produce results and to build networks
of researchers that span academia, industry, and government.
However, these policies tend to multiply funding sources for research,
and thus to generate the disappointments and conflicts described above.
In the process, the very existence of a science and technology policy
makes global accountability less likely.
Tensions between 
the EU and its 
member states
Adding to the above complexity and potential problems for a unified
approach to accountability, we have the additional factor of the way
the EU organises for innovation and R&D.  As most of us know,
many member states of the European Union, especially the larger
economies, provide their own large-scale funding of research through
their own national science foundations, or systems of national labs,
and so on.  For example, France allocated 1.08% of its national budget
to R&D in 1996, and this percentage has dropped to 0.93% as of
2000, while at the same time the EU’s direct funding has increased
dramatically, both in terms of euros spent and in terms of percentage
of budget (Key Figures 2002).  The EU itself directly funds research
on a fairly large scale, through programs such as the 6th Framework,
which has a budget of over 17 billion euros.  Between the national
and supranational level, there may not be completely overlapping
requirements in terms of accountability, by virtue of the fact that the
national governments are concerned with promoting the interests of
their nations (and rightly so), while the EU is concerned with the
entire community.
Compare this to the US, where the Federal government funds R&D via
several agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health, the Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency, and so forth.  The difference is that
at the level of government, the separate US states provide very little
funding.  When we add this difference to the other structural problems
I discussed above, the potential for conflicting requirements for
accountability rises.
Conclusion
The one bright spot in this accountability tangle is that at least, all
the above constituencies think they are doing their research for the
benefit of society.  Regardless of the potential for conflict among
different interpretations of that ideal, we can hope that maybe,
eventually, there will be a way to reconcile some of the various
views of accountability, starting from this shared belief.  However,
in the short run neither I, nor, apparently, other participants at the
Foresight Conference, see how that will happen.  Who decides what
kind of accountability applies to whom?  Can we ever agree as a
society on this question?  Should power within organizations be the
sole criterion for determining accountability?
In the end, we must also bring the discussion back to the European
context, as this was its original purpose. If we think about it, the
only additional complexity that Europe faces, relative to the US (or
Japan, or other points of comparison) resides in the differing goals
of the EU, as a “government” and a major source of research fun-
ding, and of the member states, which also have long and proud
histories of funding R&D and demand accountability to one degree
or another.  All the other problems or issues outlined above hold
equally well for the US as for Europe.   Yet somehow, the debate
over the accountability of research never seems to inspire the same
level of fervor across the Atlantic as it does here in Europe.  Are we
Europeans asking for too much where accountability is concerned?
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